Abstract: Many protocols running over the Internet are neither formalised, nor formally analysed. The amount of documentation for telecommunication protocols used in real-life applications is huge, while the available analysis methods and tools require precise and clear-cut protocol clauses. A manual formalisation of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used in Voice over IP (VoIP) applications is not feasible. Therefore, by combining the information retrieved from the specication documents published by the IETF, and traces of real world SIP trac we craft a formal specication of the protocol in addition to an implementation of the protocol. In the course of our work we detected several weaknesses, both of SIP call setup and in the Asterisk implementation of the protocol. These weaknesses could be exploited and pose as a threat for authentication and non-repudiation of VoIP calls.
Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP) is widely used, and is about to replace the traditional, public switched telephone networks (PSTN) for two main reasons: (1) Service providers and customers experience cost savings, especially for long distance calls. Since VoIP uses the Internet as carrier, the cost of setting up a phone call needs no more eort than sending an email. (2) Added functionality and exibility.
The VoIP protocols are capable of providing a number of additional services like instant messaging, presence, conferencing, events notication, video calls and other multimedia transmissions and location independence (mobility).
VoIP services cannot rely their security on the telecommunication infrastructure, dedicated lines, physically protected switches, and certied telephony equipment.
A number of VoIP security threats have been identied [VoIPSA, 2005] and discussed [Keromytis, 2009] . Even if
VoIP services have to be secured by cryptographic techniques, the employed protocols and their implementations must undergo a thorough formal crypto-analysis.
A common combination in VoIP is to use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [Rosenberg et al., 2002] for signalling, e.g., setting up and tearing down calls, and specic protocols for the actual media transfer.
The designers of SIP focused on functionality for providing specic services rather than security features [Salsano et al., 2002] . However, security issues have been recognised to be an area of further investigation and improvement [Arkko et al., 2003 , Endler and Collier, 2006 , Geneiatakis et al., 2005 , Kuhn et al., 2005 . Discussions about potential weaknesses and attacks on SIP have, in most cases, been kept on an informal level [Sinnreich and Johnston, 2006 , Persky, 2007 , Porter, 2006 , Xin, 2007 , Zhang et al., 2007 .
Our goal has been to use formal modelling of SIP in order to (1) verify whether the Asterisk implementation of SIP follow the specications; and (2) perform attacks exploiting weaknesses in the protocol definition, and its implementations. This work is based on [Hagalisletto and Strand, 2008] , where the digest access authentication in SIP registration is analysed, and [Hagalisletto et al., 2009 ] where a SIP call-hijack is found and formalised. We use the same authentication mechanism in the call-setup explained in this paper.
There have been other works that analyse SIP and its security congurations formally [Diab et al., 2008, Gupta and Shmatikov, 2007] , and the work of the AVISPA Copyright © 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we give a high level overview of SIP, and the tool PROSA that we have used to analyse the call setup. In Section 3, the formal specication of digest access authentication and call setup is described. After discussing whether Asterisk implements the SIP protocol correctly (Section 3.4), we show that a vicious attack on the call setup specication can be performed using the specication obtained previously is presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we implement the attack in a testbed. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss and evaluate the approach.
Background
SIP is an application layer signalling protocol developed by the IETF. The core functionality of SIP is specied in RFC3261 [Rosenberg et al., 2002] A dialog between two user agents Alice and Bob is conrmed, when Bob gets an acknowledgement (message 11) that Alice has accepted to communicate in. A dialog that is not conrmed is called an early dialog. A dialog can be terminated before it is conrmed. In case the caller is terminating the dialog prematurely, the BYE method may be used. In case the callee is terminating the call, the method CANCEL must be used instead of BYE according to the standard. Thus this unclear specication of session termination is also reected in section 15: The notion of of "hanging up" is not well dened within SIP [Rosenberg et al., 2002, p. 90] . The caller can also use CANCEL in an early dialog.
For the purpose of this paper we restrict our work to how the widely used open source telephony platform Asterisk 3 [Meggelen et al., 2005] implements SIP. Asterisk is a private branch exchanges (PBX), whose functionality is to connect phone calls. Asterisk also supports a range of other common telephony services like voice mail, conference calls and telephone menus.
The method
In order to gain initial knowledge of the behaviour of the SIP implementation in Asterisk, we record traces from real phone trac going through the Asterisk server on a realworld Asterisk conguration. This is done by using the network monitoring tool Wireshark
. Traces retrieved from
Wireshark can be presented both textually and as interaction diagrams.
The process of obtaining a formal specication of SIP is as follows: From the core IETF standards we derived an accurate description of SIP as possible. These resulting specications were typically incomplete, interaction diagrams showing the transmissions and message content were lacking. Traces of the call setup with real softphones were then used to supplement the incomplete specications, with details of message credentials. Hence, based on the Asterisk traces and SIP standard we constructed the formal models 3 Asterisk homepage: http://www.asterisk.org/ 4 Wireshark homepage: http://www.wireshark.org manually, and analysed the specications in the the protocol analyser PROSA [Hagalisletto, 2007] .
The analysis process is depicted in Figure 2 . In this process both IETF documentation and the traces are used to obtain a formal description (1) which typically enhances the understanding of the implementation (4). The formal specication is then validated by PROSA (2). If there are any errors or unreasonable elements found at this stage, the formal specication is revised (3). A correct protocol specication will then be subject to hand-crafted or automatically generated attacks. The correctness of manually constructed attacks will then be checked by validation in a similar way as for noncompromised protocol specications, thereafter simulated in PROSA.
Finally, the output of the analysis is a report that either conrms the initial security requirements or points at weaknesses that break some security goals (5). If no attacks are found then the protocol is considered preliminary secure (6). If an attack is found then the protocol is not secure and a revision is made (7). Since the formal specications are derived from a concrete implementation, the report gives feedback onto the implementation (8). 3 Formal specication of SIP call-setup SIP denes distinct functionality for registration, call setup and modication, call control and mid-call signalling. We refer to these parts as`sub-protocols' since each of these transactions requires its own sequence of message exchanges.
We take a closer look at the sub-protocols digest access authentication, call setup and call teardown. Call teardown denotes the explicit event of terminating a call, specied by message 12-15 in Figure 1 . These are specied in a form commonly used in the literature. 
Authentication
According to RFC3261 [Rosenberg et al., 2002] , there are three ways to congure SIP authentication: plain-text authentication, weak authentication, and strong authentication.
Plain-text authentication sends the authentication credentials unprotected. Weak authentication is an adaptation of the HTTP digest access authentication [Franks et al., 1999] that requires a shared secret between the two participants. Strong authentication uses S/MIME [Ramsdell, 2004] and requires the participants to own personal certicates. Strong authentication has failed to gain widespread adoption due to increased complexity and cost [Sisalem et al., 2009] .
A typical application of digest access authentication is given by a challenger S requesting a client A to authenticate as described in the following protocol skeleton:
Agents A and S share the symmetric key K pwd AS . Initially, the challenger S sends a nonce N S to the client A.
The client responds by sending the basic entities in plain text, except the password, and then the response itself, the payload of D 2 .
The entities involved in digest access authentication are 
The authentication is one-way: A is authenticated to S, guaranteed by the secrecy of the shared key K pwd AS . Agent S can be certain that the message comes from A, since A is the only agent except S who possesses the key. Integrity of the message entities involved is provided by the fact that the hash could only be generated by A and freshness of the message is provided by the challenger nonce N S .
Teardown sub-protocols
The trace described in Figure 1 is one out many possible traces. Teardown of sessions can be performed at any stage in the session. Therefore the nal four messages 12-15 in Figure 1 and pT 14 ¡T 17 q in Figure 4 , can be considered as a teardownBYE sub-protocol run by three agents.
Instances of the teardown protocol is running in parallel with the call setup protocol, which implies that a BYE message received to any participant causes the host session of the call setup to be terminated. A SIP compliant specication where SIP methods are propagated correctly results in the following specication of teardown, extracted from the Wireshark protocol dump:
where C denotes the role of the agent initiating the teardown, D denotes the responder agent, while T denotes the proxy server. Instances of the teardown protocol are started by the call setup protocol, while the call-setup is terminated by the teardown protocol.
.
Since the callee might terminate a session before the dialog is conrmed, using the CANCEL method, we have a sub-protocol teardownCANCEL, which is analogous to teardownBYE, except that the SIP method BYE is replaced with CANCEL, throughout in the previous specication, in addition to two chains of receipts.
The teardownCANCEL protocol contains additional notication messages, rst the 487 Request Terminated method succeeding each OK message, and then nally the propagation of an acknowlegment for the agent cancelling the phone call, that the other party has teared down its session (TC 7 and TC 8 ).
Formalising call setup permitting arbitrary teardown
Since we do not know which of the agents actively closes a session, we model that each agent starts a passive session of the teardown sub-protocol. In the example shown in Figure 1 Alice actively closes the session, where she plays the role of B of the teardown sub-protocol. Consequently, the Asterisk server acts in the role of S. Generally, both Alice and Bob might actively tear down a session by starting an instance of teardown in the role of A.
Combining the Wireshark protocol dump with the SIP specication we get Figure 3 . In order to model this we go beyond standard protocol notation and introduce the clauses pQ 1 ¡ Q 6 q. 
Call identiers for the sessions
A -S and B -S respectively Clause pQ 1 q reads agent A locally starts a session of the teardownCANCEL protocol, such that agent A plays the responder role D, agent B plays the initiator role C, and the server S plays the server role. The notation RolepA, Cq means that the agent A plays the C role in the given protocol, similar to procedure calls with parameter substitution in ordinary programming languages. The rst local clause pQ 1 q states that A initially starts listening for a possible CANCEL message from B within the early dialog. The server propagates the CANCEL and OK methods involved in the teardown sub-protocol. In an early dialog, the caller Alice is the only UAC that can send terminate an early dialog using the BYE method. Hence Bob might receive a BYE from the caller Alice, specied by pQ 3 q. In case of the server there are two cases: Clause pQ 2 q starts a session where the server S is waiting for a BYE from A, while in pQ 4 q, the server starts a similar session waiting for B sending a CANCEL-message. When the dialog is conrmed, the callee Bob might terminate the call-seup by using BYE, hence both Alice and server S initiates instances of the teardownBYE protocol, in clause pQ 5 q and pQ 6 q respectively.
Deviations from the SIP specication
The trace in Figure 4 shows that the Asterisk implementation of SIP diverges from the specication described in 1. Alice's phone starts to ring (message T 7 ) before Bob is authenticated to the server. The meaning of an incoming`Ringing' message received by Alice is that Bob has received an INVITE message, and she is ready to start a call if Bob answers the call. Hence, in order to follow the SIP RFCs message pT 9 q should come before message pT 7 q. Hence Alice is fooled to believe that Bob's phone is ringing, which is not the case.
Therefore we simulated scenarios where the responder Bob was disconnected from the network just after receiving the INVITE message. Alice still received a Ringing message. This behaviour is also conrmed in experiments using soft phones.
The acknowledgement received by Bob in message
pT 11 q arrives before Alice sends the message in clause pT 13 q. However, at this point Bob is mislead to believe that Alice has acknowledged the Ringing request from Bob. 
After teardown initiated by

Attack on the call setup
In the following, we consider attacks that do not rely on successful registration attacks. We assume that the attacker I is as powerful as the Dolev Yao attacker [Dolev and Yao, 1983] who controls the entire network, can intercept any message, impersonate as any other agent, and inject whatever entity it knows into SIP messages.
Cryptography is assumed to be perfect, no brute force attacks on the underlying cryptographic algorithms are considered in this paper.
In the following we describe how it is possible for an attacker to hijack both the initiator and responder roles. In the initial part of the attack, described in Figure 9 , the intruder only passively listens in the authentication subprotocol. In the protocol clauses pP 1.1.a q through pP 1.4.b q the intruder acts as a passive man-in-the-middle, obtaining information from plain text entities. From the knowledge gained during the initial eavesdropping, an attacker can perform a combined attack on both the caller and the caller, as shown in Figure 5 .
In the attack, as shown in, the attacker Ivory (denoted I in Figure 9 ) begins by eavesdropping the initial four messages concerned with establishing the call and authenticating the caller Alice to the server. Then Ivory tears down Alice's session prematurely by using a BYE message, and thereafter terminates Bob's session before he has entered the media session. Before the media session has started, the attacker has taken over the call, and can start a conversation with agent Frank (denoted F in Figure 9 ).
The attacker tears down the session after pretending to be Alice. The server S cannot discover that the two local sessions at each calling party are teared down. The attack eectively breaks the authenticity of the participants, since we no longer can trust the identity of the users involved in the phone call. As a consequence the intruder I could set up an arbitrary call, that Alice is billed for and that the logs, that telephony providers are obliged to carry out by legislation, are incorrect. Hence, the attack shows that non-repudiation is broken as well.
Real world attack
A large number of VoIP attack tool exists [Endler and Collier, 2006 , Park, 2008 , Sisalem et al., 2009 , Porter, 2006 , and many of these are SIP specic. To implement the attack, SIP messages must be intercepted, crafted and then injected into the ongoing SIP transaction. Some SIP attack tools are specic, like SIPp 6 , and some are generic which can be used to craft arbitrary SIP messages, like SipSak 7 . SipSak takes a text le, with handcrafted SIP messages, as input.
The attacker must intercept the SIP header Call-ID and the tag parameter used in the To: and From: header elds to masquerade as a legitimate user. These three random values is used to identify the SIP dialog. The SIP messages can be captured using the network snier tcpdump or Wireshark manually, but this operation must be done automatically in real-time, since the ongoing SIP dialog must be intercepted and modied.
To implement, we split the attack into three main tasks.
The rst task is to block out Alice and Bob from the phone call using SIP CANCEL. Then we change the RTP media (voice) meta data in the SIP stream to use Frank's and Ivory's IP address instead of Alice's and Bob's. Third and nally, a RTP stream between Frank and Ivory is set up.
First part: Block out Alice and Bob
We can block out Bob and Alice from the phone call by either sending a SIP BYE or SIP CANCEL message. A BYE message is normally sent when one of the calling parties hangs up the phone. According to the SIP specication [Rosenberg et al., 2002, page 89 ] the caller can send a BYE message before the INVITE processing is completed, but the callee can not. The callee can only send a BYE after the INVITE processing is completed and the callee has taken the phone, see the ten rst messages in Figure 1 . If the callee, in our case Bob, wants to abort an ongoing INVITE processing he must send a CANCEL. The CANCEL message can be sent by both the caller and the callee before the INVITE processing is completed. The result of an CANCEL message is an immediate teardown of the ongoing INVITE Sending a SIP CANCEL message initiates a 487 Request Terminated response from the receiver and eectively tears down the ongoing INVITE session before the callee answers the phone, see Figure 6 . The CANCEL message includes a Call-ID value that identies this particular SIP transaction.
We use a slightly modied version of the VoIP attack tool sip-kill 8 which implements this part of the attack. A screen dump from the attack tool in action can be seen 8 sip-kill can be downloaded here: http://skora.net/images/ voip-security/sip-kill Our work provides the designers of VoIP protocols with a set of tools for protocol analysis. The PROSA language and framework can be used to formally specify and analyse protocols and their specic implementations in a rigorous way. The use of traces, and the analysis with PROSA, can help to detect dierences between protocol specication and implementation. The behaviour of implementations is therefore analysed, and treated as specication for a variant of the employed protocols. Attacks could be designed and tested rapidly compared to the traditional approaches as described in [Porter, 2006] and [Endler and Collier, 2006 Figure 9 : Formal attack when hijacking the initiator and the responder.
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